The 1953 Iranian Coup

You will often hear people dispute the importance of studying history, with detractors claiming that it is boring, it focuses on just “great men,” or that studying history means you live in the past and are ignorant of the present. But here at Seeking History, we believe that studying history helps unlock a greater understanding of our current world, and a prime example of this is to explore how a 1953 coup in Iran led to the Islamic hardline regime that is currently in place and has been since 1979. Operation Ajax or Operation Boot, a joint venture by the American CIA and the British SIS/MI6, targeted the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and resulted in Mosaddegh’s ouster as Prime Minister of Iran, in favor of bolstering the Shah of Iran. This western sponsored and orchestrated coup is still resented by Iranians today as many believe it deprived them of a popular leader who could have changed or altered the path of Iran, with an Islamic revolution never occurring if he had not been removed. While Britain has never, and probably never will, admit it’s role in the Iranian coup, the United States publicly admitted to their role in 2023 for the first time.

              Iran, for most of its recent history, was a monarchial state with a king known as the Shah. While by the mid-20th century, most Iranians did not resent or regard the Shah with hostility, they were looking for a more modern Iran. Iran had strong ties to the West, and in return the West pumped large amounts of money into the country to ensure their economic interests and petroleum supply lines were protected and uninterrupted. Numerous companies sprouted in Iran as joint ventures between the Iranians and Western nations like Britain and the United States, leading to a sense amongst Iranians that the West was stealing or siphoning Iran’s natural wealth. One of these companies, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now known as BP), and its resistance to Iranian state oversight, became a core cause of the coup.

             The foundations of the coup were laid in the 1940s, when the British and Soviets invaded, and then subsequently occupied Iran during the Second World War to ensure a constant flow of petroleum for the war effort. In the process, the Shah, Reza Shah, was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. It is not conjecture to assume that Mohammad Reza, after witnessing the downfall of his father due to his resistance against the Allies, understood that he should hitch his fate to the wagon of Western power, and especially to the newly emergent power of the United States. In the wake of the war, and the eventual withdrawal of Anglo-Soviet forces in 1946, Reza began to radically change the culture of Iran, adopting western ideals and grandiose plans for a westernized Iran as a middle eastern industrial powerhouse that he began to implement through the 1940s and early 1950s. However, nationalists in Iran, whilst nominally backing the Shah, believed that Iran could only achieve this plan with a reduction of reliance on foreign investment and industry, with Iranian domestic industry filling the gap. Foreign investment, especially in the petroleum sector, had been prevalent in Iran since at least the early 20th century, when Britain dominated Iran’s oil industry through multi-national corporations and exclusivity contracts on Iranian oil. However, due to the contracts and these British corporations, Iranian domestic industry was severely lacking and uncompetitive. In order to quickly push Iranian domestic industry forward, a nationalist camp emerged that advocated for the nationalization and seizure of foreign companies operating in Iran, primarily focused on the petroleum industry.

               In 1949 an assassination attempt on the Shah’s life changed his outlook even further, he started to increase his involvement in politics, amending the constitution to increase his own power and creating a national Iranian senate, filling around half the seats with men sympathetic to the Shah’s goals. This power grab eroded public sympathy for the Shah, initially high in the wake of the assassination attempt, and created opposition to his new political interest. Many believed that he should rule in the style of a constitutional monarchy, reigning but having little direct control over the standard political process. A new political party emerged within the Senate, called the National Front, that adopted the ideals of nationalization of industry and increased industrial control by Iranians - not foreign investors or companies. The debate around the role of the Shah and the future of Iran’s oil created a dangerous and violent political process, culminating in the assassination of the Prime Minister, Haj Ali Razmara, in 1951. Razmara was against the nationalization desire and backed the Shah in his goal to westernize Iran, making him a target of hardline Islamists and nationalists. The National Front was able to secure enough votes to replace Razmara with Mohammad Mosaddegh, a widely popular politician who was heavily in favor of nationalization. Fadaiyan e-Islam, the hardline Islamic faction within Iran at the time and responsible for the assassination of Razmara, aligned themselves with Mosaddegh. The combination of the National Front of Mosaddegh and the Fadaiyan movement, caused widespread disruption in the Iranian political world. Mosaddegh was aiming to remove British and foreign investment, while the Fadaiyans used masses of religious zealots to attack those against nationalization and the National Front. Unlike the Fadaiyans and Mosaddegh, the Shah and Mosaddegh did not see eye to eye for three main reasons: Mosaddegh had ancestral ties to the previous ruling dynasty of Iran and considered the Shah to be a usurper of the Iranian throne, that Mosaddegh was too popular, and that Mosaddegh was a strong believer in the Shah ruling as a constitutional monarch, although both believed in an Iran that should be modern and progressive. This belief by Mosaddegh that Iran should be progressive and a secular state, led to a cooling of ties between the Fadaiyans and the National Front by 1952.

               Tensions came to a head in 1952 when Mosaddegh and the Shah began to fight over the Shah’s role in Iran. Mosaddegh used the National Front, and his popular support, to make blocking attempts at the Shah’s political power. Mosaddegh’s public support of oil nationalization (something the Shah also supported, but less aggressively) led to Mosaddegh becoming so popular amongst the people that the Shah was limited in his ability act against him or the United Front. The Shah learned this the hard way when he decided to fire Mosaddegh later in ’52, but was forced to quickly reinstate him after widespread public outrage.  

               With Mosaddegh’s power cemented, he took on the British and their control over Iran’s oil, demanding better contracts. In these new contracts, countries like the United States would receive a share of Iranian oil, reducing Britain’s share. Additionally Iran wished to divide profits by 50/50. Of course Britain resisted this measure with great gusto, even against the strong advisement by its ally, the United States. Realizing that Mosaddegh was becoming a legitimate challenge to British interest, they began planning to overthrow his government. Further negotiations between the British and Iranians, with the United States acting as a third party, ensued but those failed, and the British seized their main oil field (but not the refinery) from Iranian management, the Abadan Oil Fields, in response. The British then enacted an embargo of Iranian oil produced with the remaining refinery.

               Due to the effectiveness of the British embargo and the collapse of his support from the Fadaiyan (this occurred because the Mosaddegh was a firm believer in separation of church and state and resisted Fadaiyan pressure to pass more religiously hardline policies), Mosaddegh found himself in a challenging position. To shore up his support Mosaddegh entered into an unofficial alliance with the communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, replacing the Fadaiyan. With economic uncertainly and political turmoil enveloping Iran, Mosaddegh clung to power using emergency measures, generating even more controversy, and alienating political allies. The support from the communist party, Mosaddegh becoming more autocratic as his power waned, and the political upheaval began to cause the United States to worry that a communist takeover of Iran was possible. A further blow to Mosaddegh occurred in 1953 when supporters in parliament resigned in mass due to Mosaddegh leveraging emergency powers. In response, Mosaddegh passed a referendum to dissolve parliament and instead give him powers to make laws himself, causing an uproar and accusations of treason.

               The United States, up to this point, had actively resisted Britain’s persistence in bringing the US on board for a coup. President Truman had other concerns, namely the Korean War, but when Dwight D. Eisenhower took over the British were successfully able to convince the United States that a communist takeover was possible and that the Soviets were really behind this push for nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. While this claim was mostly false, it played on the growing American fears of a Soviet controlled world. HThe US took over from Britain as the chief planner of the coup and approached the Shah for his support. Initially, he was reluctant, but was convinced when the CIA informed him that he would also be removed from power if he did not back their efforts. The CIA representative who handled most of the communication and conversations with the Shah was the grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, Kermit Roosevelt Jr. Roosevelt was instrumental in convincing the Shah to back the plan and for him to issue royal directives, or firmans, to start the coup, and cultivated a large network of military and civilian supporters for the Shah.

               Now that MI6 and CIA had the backing of the Shah, selection for a replacement for Mosaddegh began, landing on General Fazlollah Zahedi. Zahedi being a loyalist to the Shah and having support of the army made him a natural choice. The plan drawn up would unfold like this, due to Mosaddegh’s dismissal of Parliament, the Shah would issue a royal decree firing Mosaddegh and replacing him with Zahedi, using the army to block any dissent. The Shah and his wife left to go on “vacation” in northern Iran in anticipation of the coup. The coup was approved by Eisenhower and set to commence in mid-august. On August 15th, when the commander of the imperial guard arrived to inform Mosaddegh that he was being dismissed, Mosaddegh, who had advanced knowledge about the coup, ordered the commander arrested. Mosaddegh’s supporters, upon hearing the news, took the streets to protest the army’s actions, resulting in mass demonstrations. Fearing an overthrow in the wake of the Mosaddegh’s defiance of the dismissal order, the Shah and his wife fled to Baghdad then to Italy. Meanwhile a standoff occurred between Zahedi and Mosaddegh, with each side attempting to order the arrest of the other and claiming to be the rightful prime minister, with Mosaddegh succeeding in arresting dozens of coup plotters. Mosaddegh, believing the coup to have failed, ordered his supporters to head home and the CIA to leave the country. However, Roosevelt received the order to leave well after it was delivered, likely slowed by MI6, and went to work to plan a second coup to quickly follow the first.

               Four days after the first coup failed, Zahedi was still on the run but popular opinion began to turn against Mosaddegh due to his banning of all demonstrations, arrest of political opponents, and his lean into autocratic tendencies. Fears of communism also spurred upper class Iranians to turn against him and religious fundamentalists rallied in defiance of his rule. Large street demonstrations began (likely first organized by the CIA) that turned into street fighting between the Tudeh and anti-Mosaddegh supporters. More and more citizens took to the streets against Mosaddegh, believing rumors that he was attempting to seize the throne (also likely spread by the CIA), and armed themselves against the Tudeh and Mosaddegh supporters. Zahedi, ordered the parts of the army still loyal to him to leave their barracks and put an end to the chaos. The army stormed Tehran, drove off the Tudeh, seized government buildings, and secured Mosaddegh’s arrest after firing a tank shell into his home that forced him to come out. Upon hearing the success of the second coup, the Shah returned from Rome (with the director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, on his plane) and Zahedi took his position as prime minister.

               Mosaddegh was tried and sentenced to death but had his sentence commuted to prison then house arrest for the rest of his life. In the aftermath of the successful coup, the United States (and Iran) agreed to restore the status of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and reverse its nationalization but also broke their monopoly in favor of American and French oil companies, along with Shell Corporation. The tactics that Kermit Roosevelt Jr and other CIA operatives used to launch the second coup would be replicated in other countries where the United States had interests. Resentment of American influence over the country and the Shah grew in the coup’s wake culminating in a difficult 1970s for the Shah. Nearly thirty years after Mosaddegh’s removal, the Fadaiyan movement’s successors would launch the 1979 Islamic revolution and one of the core tenants of the revolution would be reversing the “damage” of foreign and American interference of Iran’s internal affairs, namely the support for the Shah and meddling in Iran’s political process, partly referring to Mosaddegh’s ouster. Mosaddegh, while controversial during his tenure as Prime Minister of Iran, has become a symbol of Iranian democracy, even to this day.